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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of job mobility and tenure on wage dynamics. In this respect, 
theory assesses that high job mobility and low tenure are associated to lower wage drop when 
workers experience a job change. 
We test this theory first comparing two labour market (i.e. Denmark and a large Italian region, 
Veneto) characterized by different job mobility and tenure, as a consequence of different level 
of EPL. Secondly, we perform a within Veneto analysis, comparing the different effects when 
workers are employed in small rather than big firms. Data drawn from the VWH (Veneto 
Workers  History) and IDA (for Denmark) registered data, from 1987 to 2001, are used. In 
Denmark job mobility has a positive effect on wage increases, while built up on firm-specific 
human capital has a negative effect. In Veneto, instead, it appears that long tenure are more 
rewarding. Some evidences of positive impact of moving from job to job when the barriers are 
lower come from the analysis of the differences between small and big firms in Veneto. 
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In the last decades, there have been a large debate about wage structure and
the rise of wage inequality1 in many advanced economies.
Most of this literature attributes part of this rise in inequality, in particular
for US, to expanding wage diﬀerentials between educational and experience
groups2. However, measurable characteristics such as education and experi-
ence can explain at most half of the total surge in wage inequality (Violante
(2002)). Juhn et al. (1993) conclude that the majority of the increase in US
wage inequality, for example, is residual, i.e. due to unobserved attributes
of workers belonging to the same educational or demographic group.
This rise in residual inequality (or within group inequality) is a crucial feature
of the recent dynamics of the wage distribution in some developed countries
such as, for example, US, Canada and UK (Violante (2002)).
These changes in residual inequality have become of major interest for labor
and macro economist. In particular, the literature focused on the determi-
nants of the residual inequality trying to understand if the forces that have
expanded between group diﬀerentials also aﬀect within groups diﬀerentials.
The conventional view of the existing literature is that this phenomenon is
the result on an increase in the return to ability, i.e. some permanent (model
speciﬁc) attribute driving the ex-ante unobserved heterogeneity among ob-
servationally similar workers3 (Violante (2002)).
The main empirical implication of this kind of models is that the rise in resid-
ual inequality should be extremely persistent because workers would tend to
become more stratiﬁed in the wage distribution on the basis of their innate
skill dimension. However, the empirical literature shown that a sizeable part
of the sharp rise in residual inequality is attributable to factors that have a
very temporary nature (Violante (2002)).
Consistently with this view, Violante (2002) proposes a theory based upon
the dynamics of post-schooling skill accumulation along the labor market
history of ex-ante identical workers (so-called Skill Dynamics Hypothesis
(SDH)).
The two crucial hypothesis of this theory are the technological acceleration
and vintage-speciﬁc skill. With respect to this second feature, there is exten-
sive empirical work showing that skill cumulated in the labor market have
a large speciﬁc component: First, there is evidence of signiﬁcant returns
to tenure4 and, second, workers are subject to substantial and persistent
wage losses upon displacement. Both facts suggest that the knowledge cu-
1Wage inequality is deﬁned as the ratio between the ninth and the ﬁrst deciles of the
weekly log-wage distribution.
2See, for example, Katz (1994).
3This mechanism can be called Innate Ability Hyphotesis (IAH). See, for example,
Galor and Moav (2000), Caselli (1999).
4See, for example, Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (2003).
1mulated in the job can only be partially transferred to new occupations.
Accumulation and transferability of speciﬁc knowledge represent important
determinants of individual wages, so they should be regarded as potential
sources of changes in cross sectional wage inequality (Violante (2002)).
Moreover, the theory of ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital predicts that workers
build up ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital in the current job, which they will lose
if they leave or change job. Thus, workers with long tenure are more likely
to have more speciﬁc human capital than workers with less tenure (Bingley
and Westergaard-Nielsen (2003)).
The empirical microeconomics literature for US oﬀers some interesting re-
sults in this direction. In fact, a series of studies5, using ﬁrm level data,
shows that there is strong positive empirical relationship between advanced
technology and skill. Advanced technology interacts with each component of
skill quite diﬀerentially: ﬁrms that use advanced technology are more likely
to use high ability workers, but less likely to use high-experienced workers.
Most of the literature in this ﬁeld is represented by macroeconomics studies
or ﬁrm-level studies. Moreover, the majority of the studies are for US.
Moving from the literature presented and focusing more on wage variability
overtime rather than on cross sectional wage inequality, some questions arise:
are there any eﬀects of job mobility on wage variability? Is it better to built
up on ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital or not? Considering that diﬀerent levels
of Employment Protection aﬀect the job mobility, does the mobility aﬀects
diﬀerently wages in countries with diﬀerent level of EPL?
The aim of this paper is then to investigate how job mobility and skill trans-
ferability aﬀect workers wage changes, when diﬀerent level of Employment
Protection are enforced.
The analysis is divided in two part. First, we compare Denmark and a large
Italian region, Veneto. This comparison is particular compelling because the
two area are very similar in the level of unemployment, GDP growth, ﬁrm
size distribution and so on6, but they diﬀer in the level of EPL enforced.
This diﬀerence in protection should lead to high mobility and low tenure for
Denmark and low mobility and high tenure for Veneto; in this way, we are
able to detect diﬀerences in the impact of job mobility and tenure on wages
dynamics.
For the same reason, we perform also an analysis within Veneto distinguish-
ing between small and big ﬁrm, considering that in Italy the Employment
Protection is enforced diﬀerently depending on ﬁrm size.
In the empirical analysis, data drawn from the VWH (Veneto Workers His-
tory) and the IDA data set have been used. Both data sets are built on
administrative data and they contains information about all the population
of workers and ﬁrms. We combine the propensity score matching with a
5See, for example, Haltiwanger et al. (2005) and Abowd et al. (2007).
6See section 2 for further details.
2ﬁxed eﬀect estimator.
The paper is organized as follow. Next section introduces brieﬂy the the-
oretical framework of the study. Third section gives a brief description of
the institutional features of the labor markets in the two countries and dis-
cuss the comparability between Denmark and Veneto. The fourth presents
the data and the empirical model. The ﬁfth presents the estimation results.
Finally, last section oﬀers some concluding remark.
2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework behind the analysis proposed in this study refers
mainly to the economic model proposed by Violante (2002).
In the paper the author proposed a macroeconomic model the reduction on
workers ability to transfer skill when changing job, due to acceleration in the
rate of quality improvement of the equipment, increases the cross sectional
variance of skills and, therefore, wages (Violante (2002)).
The economic mechanism of the model is as follow. Ex-ante identical work-
ers face a frictional labor market where they search for jobs (machines).
Machines embody diﬀerent vintages of technology, and the productivity of
the leading edge machine advances exogenously at a constant rate. In every
period workers choose whether to keep the current match with the machine
or separate and search for a new match. When matched, workers learn
vintage-speciﬁc skills. When moving they can only partially transfer their
skills across machines: the amount of skills they can transfer depends on the
technological distance between machines, hence it is decreasing in the speed
of technology. A technological acceleration implies that workers have less
ability to transfer skills from old to new machines. As a consequences, the
typical labor market history of the worker involves lower average skills (but
skills of a younger vintage), larger wage losses upon separation and higher
wage growth on the job (Violante (2002)).
In other words, from a microeconomic point of view, if a worker moves a lot
and doesn’t accumulate ﬁrm-speciﬁc human skill she will incurs in a lower
wage drop, when she changes job, rather than a workers with low mobility
and high tenure. This is due to the fact that it’s easier to transfer general
rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital.
3 The institutional features
3.1 Denmark
The Danish labor market has some distinguishing features of its own (Eriks-
son and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007)). Some of these are: decentralized wage
bargaining, high trade union membership and union coverage, weak job pro-
3tection for blue collar workers and modest protection for white collar workers,
agreement between employers and trade unions as main regulatory mecha-
nism.
The key feature of the so-called "Danish Model" is, in fact, that most of
the regulatory issues related to labor market are regulated by agreements
between trade unions and employers. The social partners take responsibility
and make agreements for wage bargaining and wage setting, normal working
hours, overtime and work environment (Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen
(2007)). The role of the government is instead to provide unemployment
beneﬁt, to retrain workers who have lost their job, to provide health care
and disability pension (Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007)).
Moreover, with respect to the two elements of interest of our analysis, wages
and Employment Protection Legislation the Danish labor market has its own
speciﬁc features that make it look much like to the United States labor mar-
ket than to those of other European countries (Eriksson and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2007)).
In Denmark, there is no minimum wage legislation. The collective wage
bargaining has been for long time the predominant mode of wage determi-
nation. In more recent years, wage bargaining has become more and more
decentralized, mainly in the private sector. Nowadays, the wage bargaining
is mainly at industry or ﬁrm level, and wages have become more and more
individualized (Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (2003)).
Finally, the level of Employment Protection in Denmark is among the low-
est in the Oecd countries. There are in fact few barriers to mobility be-
tween ﬁrms. For employers the cost of laying oﬀ workers are low because of
the absence of severance pay legislation and experience rating in the unem-
ployment insurance system as well as the weak job security of particularly
blue collar workers (Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007)). In the other
hand, for the employees, costs of changing employer or experiencing unem-
ployment spells are reduced by generous unemployment beneﬁts and by the
fact that many social beneﬁts, pensions and vacation are independent of
the individual’s current employer and are hence transferable (Eriksson and
Westergaard-Nielsen (2007)).
3.2 Italy
The Italian labor market, diﬀerently with respect to the Danish one, is more
similar in its structure and its rigidities to those of other European countries.
Some of the main characteristics of the Italian labor market are: high level
of protection for workers, low level of unemployment beneﬁt, decentralized
wage bargaining, government as main actor of the regulatory mechanism.
The ﬁrst diﬀerences with respect to Denmark relates to this last aspect. In
fact, in Italy government plays the main role on the regulatory mechanism
of the labor market and the agreement between trade unions and employers
4act mainly (and merely) on collective wage bargaining.
Secondly, the level of Employment Protection is dramatically higher in Italy
than in Denmark. The costs of laying oﬀ workers are very high, depending
on ﬁrms size, in term of severance payments and additional costs related to
unjust-dismissals7.
For employees, the costs of change employer and experiencing unemployment
is higher than in Denmark. The level of Unemployment Beﬁt are in general
very low, excepts for some special unemployment program provided for dis-
placed workers coming from big ﬁrms8.
Italy and Denmark are more similar in term of wage determination and wage
bargaining. In fact, in Italy there is no minimum wage legislation, but collec-
tive agreements between trade unions and employers establish the minimum
wages at the industry level.
The wage bargaining is organized in three level, economy-wide, industry-
wide and ﬁrm-level agreements. The bargaining process as become more
and more decentralized in these years and nowadays, there is an increasing
diﬀusion of ﬁrm-level wage determinations (Leonardi and Pica (2007)).
3.3 Denmark and Veneto
In the analysis, we decide to compare Denmark with a large Italian region,
Veneto. Behind this choice there are two main reason. First, Veneto is more
comparable with Denmark than all Italy, considering the big regional and
geographical variability in the all country. Secondly, for Veneto we have reg-
ister employer-employee (similar to the Danish one) data that permit us to
reconstruct the entire career of workers.
As described in previous section, the wage determination and wage bargain-
ing mechanism have a similar structure and a similar level of decentralization.
Moreover, both Denmark and Veneto are characterized by a big concentra-
tion of small ﬁrms.
More generally, looking at the GDP growth and the unemployment rate,
they are both characterized by low unemployment rate and similar GDP
dynamics, in particular in the nineties.
The main diﬀerence between the two labor market relies instead on the dif-
ferent level of Employment Protection that determines diﬀerences in the job
mobility and tenure between the two "countries".
7See, Leonardi and Pica (2007), for further details on the Employment Protection
Legislation in Italy.
8The level of Unemployment Beneﬁt in Italy (so-called Disoccupazione ordinaria) are
40% of salary/wage. If workers are part of some special regime ("Lista di mobilità", for
example) the unemployment beneﬁt is set to 80% of the salary/wage
5Fig. 3.1: GDP grwoth - Denmark and Veneto 1987-2001
Note: Oecd and Istat data.
Fig. 3.2: Unemployment rate - Denmark and Veneto 1987-2001
Note: Oecd and Istat data.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 The data
4.1.1 Denmark
The data source use in the empirical analysis for Denmark is the so-called
IDA database kept by Statistics Denmark.
6The IDA is a longitudinal database that contains information about all in-
dividuals aged 15 to 74 and employees in all plants in Denmark during the
period 1980-2001. Information about demographic characteristics, educa-
tion, labor market experience, tenure and earnings for workers is provided.
In the same way, several information9 is provided also for ﬁrms.
All these information have been collected from several registers in Statistics
Denmark with the help of unique identiﬁcation numbers for individuals and
plants. The persons and plants are matched at the end of November in each
year (Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007)).
4.1.2 Veneto
The Veneto Worker History (VWH) is a longitudinal panel built at the De-
partment of Economics of the University of Venice on the ground of the Social
Security administrative data of the Italian Social Security System (Inps). It
refers to the entire population of employers and workers in Veneto (i.e. a
large Italian region).
The database covers each single plant and each single individual employed
in the private sector and the total period covered is 1975-2001. Inps data
include register-based information on all establishments and employees that
have been hired by those establishments for at least one day during the pe-
riod of observation, independently of the workers place of residence.
In the VWH demographics10 and job related information11 for workers are
provided. In the same way, information about location, size, date of creation,
closure date, industry are provided for each ﬁrm.
4.1.3 Sample composition
The sample selected for each country contains men and women employed in
the private sector in the period from 1987 to 2001; to avoid left censoring
of the careers, we select workers with at least 5 years of experience in the
labor market at 1987. The panel contains men and women between 25 and
55 years of age. Additional information related to the education level of
workers has been drawn from the Giove data set12 kept by Veneto Lavoro.
In sample we insert also some information related to the unemployment rate
for Denmark and Veneto. Table 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 show the compositions of the
samples.
9For example, locations, size, industry
10Sex, date of birth, place of birth.
11Type of job, contract, wage, industry.
12Giove is a public database built upon EPS (Employment Public Services) administra-
tive archives. The data are acquired from the ﬂow of ﬁrms compulsory communications.
It contains all Veneto employment data of the private sector since 1995, both workers and
ﬁrms.
7Both in Denmark and Veneto, workers are mainly men (about two third of
the sample) and equally distributed between blue collar and white collar.
With respect to the variables of interest - job mobility and tenure - the dif-
ferences between the two "countries" arise. In fact, every year between 10
to 20% of workers change job (see movers) and most of the workers have a
tenure in the previous job shorter than 2 years.
On the other hand, in Veneto, each year only 5¡10% of the workers change
job. Moreover, the majority of workers have a tenure in the previous job
longer than 5 years.
4.2 Estimation strategy
4.2.1 Comparison between Denmark and Veneto
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of job mobility and tenure
on the yearly wage variations of workers. In particular, we are interested to
verify if high mobility and low tenure reduces wage variability when workers
change job.
Considering the existing relations between wage and tenure (i.e. returns to
tenure), we distinguish the workers in two categories, movers and stayers.
The ﬁrst is our group of interest (i.e. workers that in a given year change
job with respect to year before); the second is a "control" group that should
help us to show the diﬀerent eﬀect of job mobility and tenure for movers
with respect to stayers.
The job careers of the workers and the likelihood to move depend strongly
from the characteristics of the workers and their potential experience in the
labor market.
Given these considerations, the empirical strategy used is composed by two
steps. First, we matched movers and stayers on the basis of some observable
characteristics, using a propensity score matching method13.
Eventually, a ﬁxed eﬀect analysis on the matched sample has been performed.
In practise, we estimate the following equation:
Yit = ®i + ±t + ¯Xit + °1movers + +°2job_mobility + °3tenure_lastjob+
+°4movers ¤ job_mobility + °4movers ¤ tenure + "it (1)
Yit is the outcome variable and it measures the log of the yearly wage(hourly)
change; ®i and ±t are respectively the individual ﬁxed eﬀect and the time
13For further details on propensity score see chapter 1. To match the two groups we use
a Kernel matching method. See, Becker and Ichino (2002) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003)
for further details.
8eﬀect; and, Xit is a set of control variables14. The variable movers is a
dummy variable taking value 1 if workers change job in that year and 0
otherwise. The variable movers is a dummy variable taking value 1 if workers
change job in that year and 0 otherwise; job_mobility is a dummy variable
taking value 1 if workers in the previous 3 years change job and 0 otherwise;
and, tenure is a variable measuring the year of tenure of the previous(actual
job in the case of stayers) job. Finally, there are two interactions variables,
respectively movers*job_mobility and movers*tenure that should captures
the diﬀerent eﬀect of job mobility and tenure on wage changes of movers
with respect to stayers.
The analysis has been performed on the overall sample and separately for
men and women, blue collar and white collar.
4.2.2 Within Veneto: Small and big ﬁrm
As said in the introduction, the job mobility and the tenure are inﬂuenced
by the level of EPL enforced. In the previous part, in fact, we compare two
countries with two diﬀerent level of Employment Protection.
However, the Italian Employment Protection Legislation is characterized by
diﬀerent level depending on ﬁrm size. Thus, we investigates the eﬀect of job
mobility and tenure only for Veneto, distinguishing between small (i.e. ﬁrm
with less than 15 employees) and big (i.e. ﬁrm with more than 15 employees)
ﬁrm.
As before, we ﬁrst match movers and stayers and, then, we perform a ﬁxed
eﬀect analysis on the matched sample. In practise, we estimate the following
equation:
Yit = ®i + ±i + ¯Xit + °1movers + °2D15 + °3job_mobility + °4tenure+
+°5D15 ¤ movers + °6(D15 ¤ movers) ¤ job_mobility+
+°7(D15 ¤ movers) ¤ tenure + "it (2)
where, with respect to equation (1), we introduce a new variable: D15. It is
a dummy variable taking value 1 if individuals work in a ﬁrm with less than
15 employees and 0 otherwise. In the regression, we interact this dummy
with the variables movers, tenure and job_mobility.
In particular, the two parameter of interest are °6 and °7 that describe the
diﬀerent eﬀect of job mobility and tenure on wage changes, when workers
are changing job and they work in a ﬁrm with less than 15 employees with
respect to others.
14The control variables used are age, age
2, sex, education, type of job (white or blue-
collar), industry, ﬁrm size, unemployment spell, unemployment rate.
95 Results
In this paper, we analyzed the eﬀect of job mobility and tenure on the yearly
hourly wage variations, ﬁrst comparing Denmark and Veneto and, secondly,
looking at the diﬀerences between workers employed in small and big ﬁrms.
In both cases, using registered data from 1987 to 2001 (IDA for Denmark
and VWH for Veneto), we run an analysis organized in two steps: ﬁrst, we
match movers and stayers using a propensity score matching and, secondly,
we run a ﬁxed eﬀect regression on the matched sample.
The results obtained are shown in table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
Before to go to the comment of the results, it’s important to underline the
main criticism that emerges in this study. Unfortunately, we have not, in
our data, an high number of observable to control for heterogeneity, and it’s
plausible that remains a lot of unobserved heterogeneity, probably correlated
with the three key variables: movers, job_mobility and tenure. This unob-
servable heterogeneity is partly captured by the individual ﬁxed eﬀect.
Given these cautions, we gives a brief description of ﬁrst main results that
come form our analysis.
In tab. 3.4, the results relatives to the overall sample for Denmark and
Veneto. In Denmark, there are evidence that job mobility has a positive
eﬀect on wage increase for movers and, on the other hand, built up on ﬁrm
speciﬁc capital (i.e. to have a long tenure in the previous job) has a negative
eﬀect on wage increases.
In Veneto the results are quite diﬀerent. First of all, to be a mover has a
negative and signiﬁcant impact on wage variations. Secondly, to have been
mobile in the past has a positive eﬀect, while the tenure has not eﬀect on
wage variations for movers with respect to stayers.
These results probably reﬂect the fact that in Denmark that wage structure is
very compressed and the returns to tenure are low (Bingley and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2003)), thus the only way for workers to get wage increases is to
move frequently. In Veneto, instead, the returns to tenure are higher and
thus it’s more rewarding to remain in the ﬁrm rather than to move. Al-
though to have been mobile in the past has a positive eﬀect. Finally, in
Veneto tenure has not a negative eﬀect on wage variations and this is proba-
bly due to the fact that in this region the existence of cluster make the ﬁrm
speciﬁc human capital more valuable when moving within the cluster. The
results hold also looking separately men and women, blue collar and white
collar.
The second part of the analysis looks eﬀect of tenure and job mobility on
wages when changing job, depending on the size of the ﬁrm in which the
individual is employed. Tab. 3.7 shows the estimation results for the overall
sample.
The results are similar to the previous case. Thus, job mobility and tenure
have positive eﬀect of wage variations, but there is no evidences of diﬀerent
10eﬀect for workers employed in small ﬁrms. However, it’s important to notice
that to be employed in a small ﬁrms reduce signiﬁcantly the negative eﬀect
of changing job.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we evaluate the eﬀect of job mobility and tenure on wage vari-
ations for Denmark and Veneto.
Using data drawn from IDA (for Denmark) and VWH (for Veneto) from
1987 to 2001, we combine the propensity score matching with a ﬁxed eﬀect
analysis. We, ﬁrstly, estimate the relation comparing Denmark and Veneto
e, secondly, we perform a within analysis for Veneto, comparing wage dy-
namics for employees in small and big ﬁrms.
Despite a problem of unobserved heterogeneity due to the few number of
observable available, some ﬁrst results emerge.
We provide evidences that in Denmark job mobility has a positive eﬀects on
wage increase, while built up on ﬁrm speciﬁc capital has a negative impact.
In Veneto, the situation is diﬀerent and there are evidences that long tenure
are more rewarding in term of wage increases than short tenure.
This diﬀerences is probably due to the fact that wage structure is more com-
pressed in Denmark than in Veneto and, moreover, the existence of cluster
in the Italian region make ﬁrm speciﬁc capital more valuable.
When looking within Veneto to the diﬀerences between small and big ﬁrm,
it appear that to be in a small ﬁrm (subject to a lower level of Employment
protection) reduces dramatically the negative impact of changing job.
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industry dummies yes yes
year dummies yes yes
N.Obs 3;235;784 1;854;624
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
16Tab. 3.5: Estimation results: Denmark and Veneto - Women and men











(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
movers*tenure -0.0012
¤¤¤ 0:0005 0:0003 0.001
¤¤¤




























(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
unemployment spell -0.0002
¤¤¤ ¡0:0002 ¡0:0002 -0.001
¤¤¤






(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005)
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
N.Obs 1;721;560 1;535;220 950;567 904;057
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
17Tab. 3.6: Estimation results: Denmark and Veneto - White and Blue collars.
















(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
























(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0003) (0.0004)
unemployment spell ¡0:0002 ¡0:0007 ¡0:0002 ¡0:0001






(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003)
industry dummies yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
N.Obs. 1;543;238 1;723;456 900;765 984;876
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
18Tab. 3.7: Estimation results: Within Veneto analysis - overall sample










































industry dummies yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
N.Obs 1;854;624 950;567 984;876
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
19